We are very skeptical that corporate China would resume production as usual on 10 February (next Monday). The number of new cases is still rising rapidly at over 3,000 per day and there are signs that some places outside Hubei province are in emergency with a few cities toughening policies on mobility. Several cities in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces also announced very strict rules preventing residents from going out of their living compounds.
Comparing the coronavirus with SARS is not quite appropriate because the scope of quarantine is unprecedented. Several of our team members were in Beijing in 2003 and as far as we remember, the schools were shut down and the workers were told to work from home for a month. But the transportation service was still functioning and most other places in the country were working as usual.
While the death rate of the N-coronavirus is less than 3%, well below that of SARS in 2003 (10%) and Beijing’s response is considerably quicker than 17 years ago, the fact that the crisis is taking place during Spring Festival, China’s peak travel season means that the economy will likely take a bigger hit compared to 2003.
Xi has achieved a more effective central leadership and a clear-cut decision-making process. Ambitious policy initiatives such as financial de-risking and cutting industrial capacities were carried out forcefully and rapidly. But at the same time, as local officials become wary of potential wrongdoings, the centralization process has also caused inertia across local governments, resulting in potential risks in policy implementation.
China’s economy looks fine from a cyclical perspective, as data released last Friday suggest. Real GDP growth stabilized at 6% in Q4 2019, ending five consecutive quarters of deceleration, and most monthly indicators beat expectations in December. The continued recovery of automobile, electronic equipment and external demand will offer the tailwind through the next couple of quarters.
For the United States, the major gain is China’s commitment to purchase more American goods. Based on the agreement, the annual export of goods and services from the US to China should increase to $263bn in 2020 and $310bn in 2021, and 80% of the increase would come from goods.
For the United States, the major gain is China’s commitment to purchase more American goods. Based on the agreement, the annual export of goods and services from the US to China should increase to $263bn in 2020 and $310bn in 2021, and 80% of the increase would come from goods.
China’s financial regulators keep reiterating that raising capital is a top task for banks, especially the medium and small ones. This is necessary partly because Chinese banks need more capital to support its 12-13% loan growth, and partly because the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) wants to avoid more bank failures after bailing out three medium banks in 2019. The large scale of capital raising is positive from a cyclical perspective as it removes a key constraint for banks to lend more, but the downside is that some capital instruments are cross held.
Beijing continues to reform the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in its own way in order to make them more efficient and powerful. It is expected that a new three-year plan for SOE reform will be released soon, as Vice Premier Liu He chaired an SOE reform meeting in November 2019 and announced to develop an action plan for the next three years.
The PBOC cut reserve requirement ratio (RRR) by 50bps in anticipation of liquidity withdrawal during Chinese New Year. It is rumored that banks are lobbying for another extension of transition period under the new asset management regulations. We think a three-year extension is too much, but a shorter one is likely.
Luo Huining is the most senior person appointed to HKLO since 1990 and he will have a lot discretions. He will take a more proactive approach in Hong Kong affairs and will be a decision-maker instead of a messenger.
