On 13 February, Beijing decided to overhaul the leadership of State Council Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office (HMO), the top manager of Hong Kong and Macau affairs. It demoted Zhang Xiaoming from HMO director to deputy director, and appointed Xia Baolong, incumbent vice chairman of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), as Zhang’s replacement.
Chinese government is putting more focus on restoring business operations, but the policy responses still fall short of expectations. The impact is going to be increasingly felt in the rest of Asia, and this time, countries will need to come up with their own measures to support the economy rather than waiting for Beijing to bail them out.
For the manufacturing sector, firms could resume work today if their workers and suppliers are both local, but the firms must pass strict health and sanitation checks. For instance, enough face masks must be made available to workers, a difficult requirement for many employers, as local governments have been commandeering available face masks. Those labor-intensive manufacturers employing workers from all over the country will have to wait for longer.
We are very skeptical that corporate China would resume production as usual on 10 February (next Monday). The number of new cases is still rising rapidly at over 3,000 per day and there are signs that some places outside Hubei province are in emergency with a few cities toughening policies on mobility. Several cities in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces also announced very strict rules preventing residents from going out of their living compounds.
Comparing the coronavirus with SARS is not quite appropriate because the scope of quarantine is unprecedented. Several of our team members were in Beijing in 2003 and as far as we remember, the schools were shut down and the workers were told to work from home for a month. But the transportation service was still functioning and most other places in the country were working as usual.
While the death rate of the N-coronavirus is less than 3%, well below that of SARS in 2003 (10%) and Beijing’s response is considerably quicker than 17 years ago, the fact that the crisis is taking place during Spring Festival, China’s peak travel season means that the economy will likely take a bigger hit compared to 2003.
Notably, Mao Weiming, Zhang Yuzhuo, and Dai Houliang are all Central Committee alternate members. While SOE managers are no longer included in the 205-member Central Committee as full members, those who are among the 171 alternate members are certainly of a higher political status than their peers not in the Central Committee. Mao’s appointment to the State Grid, as well as Zhang’s appointment to Sinopec and Dai’s appointment to CNPC therefore indicate that these three SOEs are of higher political importance than others.
Xi has achieved a more effective central leadership and a clear-cut decision-making process. Ambitious policy initiatives such as financial de-risking and cutting industrial capacities were carried out forcefully and rapidly. But at the same time, as local officials become wary of potential wrongdoings, the centralization process has also caused inertia across local governments, resulting in potential risks in policy implementation.
China’s economy looks fine from a cyclical perspective, as data released last Friday suggest. Real GDP growth stabilized at 6% in Q4 2019, ending five consecutive quarters of deceleration, and most monthly indicators beat expectations in December. The continued recovery of automobile, electronic equipment and external demand will offer the tailwind through the next couple of quarters.
For the United States, the major gain is China’s commitment to purchase more American goods. Based on the agreement, the annual export of goods and services from the US to China should increase to $263bn in 2020 and $310bn in 2021, and 80% of the increase would come from goods.
For the United States, the major gain is China’s commitment to purchase more American goods. Based on the agreement, the annual export of goods and services from the US to China should increase to $263bn in 2020 and $310bn in 2021, and 80% of the increase would come from goods.
